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1958] RECENT DECISIONS 1363 
REAL PROPERTY-R.EsTRIGI'IVE COVENANTS-EFFECT OF EXPIRATION OF 
TIME LIMITATION IN DEED UNDER GENERAL PLAN-Plaintiffs were the own-
ers of two lots in a subdivision originally owned by a real estate develop-
ment company. Defendants were property owners or lien holders within 
the subdivision, the development company, and the prospective purchasers 
of plaintiff's lots who refused to buy on the ground that the lots were 
subject to certain restrictions. All purchasers of lots within the subdivision 
had received the same form deed containing the identical provision that 
restrictions, including one prohibiting nonresidential use, were to be en-
forceable for twenty-one years from the date of each conveyance. The 
first lot was sold in 1927 and plaintiffs' lots were conveyed in 1944. Plain-
tiffs brought suit for a declaratory judgment that their lots were no longer 
subject to the restrictions, since more than twenty-one years had elapsed 
from the date of the first conveyance in 1927. The trial court held that 
the restrictions were no longer enforceable by the other property owners 
and were not a cloud on plaintiffs' title. On appeal, held, affirmed. From 
the date of the first conveyance in 1927, negative mutual easements were 
established for the entire subdivision and were enforceable by pur-
chasers within the plan for a period of twenty-one years. At the end of 
that time, restrictions on the first purchaser's land being unenforceable, 
mutuality among lot owners ceased and the restrictions on the remain-
ing land became unenforceable by the lot owners.1 Stanton v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., (S.C. 1957) 101 S.E. (2d) 250. 
1 Neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court indicated why the right of the 
original grantor, a defendant here, to enforce the restrictions was not a cloud on plain-
tiffs' title. This right was clearly recognized. Principal case at 252. Although the facts 
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·· Ever·since Tulk v.· Moxhay,2 restrictive covenants, similar in nature 
to the ones involved in the principal case, have been recognized as en-
forceable in equity by property owners without regard to the requirements 
of privity of estate in actions at law. The general belief has been that it 
would be inequitable to allow a property owner to violate a restriction 
of which he had notice when he -purchased the land.3 Enforcement of 
restrictive covenants on land sold under a general plan has been especially 
significant in protecting the proper development of residential subdi-
visions. 4 Equity has generally allowed these restrictions to be enforced by 
the various landowners within the subdivision absent· a showing· that 
there has been a substantial change in the surrounding neighborhood or 
evidence of other circumstances which would make enforcement inequi-
table:5 While a number of courts have listed mutuality as a requirement 
for enforcement of restrictions under a general plan, an examination of 
the cases indicates that only in a few was lack of mutuality actually a 
factor, since mutuality in fact was present in the others.6 The rationale 
b'ehind the inutuality rule is 'that it would be inequitable to allow one 
not a party to tlie covenants to obtain the Benefit of the restrictions where 
there are no corresponding restrictions burdening his own land.7 In 
the only case found to be substantially on all fours with the principal 
case, the fact that the time limitation had expired in two deeds was held 
are not clear, it may be that the grantor real estate company no longer owned any lots 
in the subdivision and would thus be unable to prove any injury sµfficient to obtain 
an injunction or compensatory damages. 
2 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848). 
3 There has _been a real problem in developing a satisfactory legal theory to give 
effect to this general belief. Clark, "The Assignability of Easements, Profits, and Equitable 
Restrictions," 38 YALE L. J. 139 at 153 (1928). The two theories that have ·been developed 
are the property theory and the contract theory. Under the former, restrictive covenants 
are treated as creating something akin to an interest in land. The interest thus created 
.is referred to as an equitable servitude or equitable easement or, in the case of a negative 
covenant, as a negative equitable easement. See CLARK, REAL COVENANTS, 2d ed., 174 
(1947); Pound, "The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919," 33 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1919). Under 
the contract theory, the covenant is considered as creating contract rights which are 
enforceable by those parties the covenant was intended directly to benefit. 3 TIFFANY, 
REAL PROPER.TY, 3d ed., §861 (1939). Neither theory has accomplished entirely satisfactory 
results ih all situations and there has been a -marked tendency among the courts to apply 
one or the other theory in a given situation in order to reach a result deemed most 
desirable. Reno, "The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land," 28 VA. L. REv. 
951 at 978 (1942). 
4 DeGray v. Monmouth Beach Clubhouse Co., 50 N.J. Eq. 329, 24 A. 388 (1892). 
5 McArthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372, 109 N.E. 162 (1915). 
6 See, e.g., DeGray v. Monmouth Beach• Clubhouse Co., note 4 supra, and Houston 
Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Products Credit Assn., 9 N.J. 122, 87 A. (2d) 319 (1952), 
where mutuality was made a requirement to enforcement ·but was not a factor in either 
decision. But see Coulter v. Seybold, (Ohio Com. Pl. 1949) 94 N.E. (2d) 47, for actual 
application of the mutuality rule in a case involving a general plan. 
7 Q'.Malley v. Central Methodist Church, 67 Ariz. 245, -194 P. (2d) 444 (1948). 
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not to bar enforcement of the covenant.8 The court in that case made 
an examination of all the circumstances of the execution of the cove-
nants and determined that they were made for the benefit of other prop-
erty owners within the development and that it would be inequitable not 
to allow the restrictions to be enforced according to their terms.9 It is 
submitted that lack of complete mutuality should not be conclusive against 
enforcement, but rather that other factors should be taken into considera-
tion before a court makes a determination that the restrictions either 
should or should not remain enforceable.10 This would seem to be the 
approach adopted in a number of cases where restrictions were held to 
be enforceable as part of a general plan although the covenants were not 
strictly mutual.11 Factors indicating that it might be inequitable to refuse 
to enforce the restrictions according to their terms would include evi-
dence that purchases were made in reliance on the restrictions remain-
ing enforceable as stated in the form deed by one property owner within 
the development against another and that those landowners no longer 
legally bound are nevertheless complying with the terms of the cove-
nants.12 Enforcement of the restrictions could still be refused upon a 
showing by the purchaser that the time limitations in so many other 
deeds had expired. that the uniform plan was no longer in effect at the 
time of his purchase. All in all, the simplest method of avoiding the prob-
lem involved in the principal case would be to insert- into the form deed 
a specific future date at which time all restrictions within the development 
would terminate,13 rather than specifying a period of time to be measured 
from the date of each conveyance. 
John D. Kelly 
s Hooker v. Alexander, 129 Conn. 433, 29 A. (2d) 308 (1942). The grantor was one 
of the parties seeking enforcement of the restrictions by injunction, but the court's 
language indicates the decision was not based on this factor. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Wolff v. Green, 199 Misc. 758, 99 N.Y.S. (2d) 495 (1950); Coughlin v. Barker, 46 
Mo. App. 54 (1891); 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §3403 (1924). 
11 Tubbs v. Green, 30 Del. Ch. 151, 55 A. (2d) 445 (1947) (restrictions omitted from 
a few deeds in general plan); Elliot v. Keely, 121 Ind. App. 529, 98 N.E. (2d) 374 (1951) 
(restrictions differed as to minimum amount owner had to expend in constructing res-
idence on lot); Allen v. Barrett, 213 Mass. 36, 99 N.E. 575 (1912); Hartt v. Rueter, 223 
Mass. 207, 111 N.E. 1045 (1916); Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224 (1935); 
Velie v. Richardson, 126 Minn. 334, 148 N.W. 286 (1914); Rowe v. May, 44 N.l\f. 264, 101 
P. (2d) 391 (1940); Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P. (2d) 781 (1946) (not all deeds 
under general plan contained restrictions). 
12 Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 139 A. 508 (1927); Rossini v. Freeman, 136 Conn. 
321, 71 A. (2d) 98 (1949); Turner v. Bracato, 206 Md. 336, 111 A. (2d) 855 (1955); Chea-
tham v. Taylor, 148 Va. 26, 138 S.E. 545 (1927). Note that this approach would be impos-
sible in California under Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919), which re-
quires that there be a specific statement in the deed granting benefit to third parties 
before they are entitled to enforce restrictions. 
13 Moore v. Kimball, 291 Mich. 455, 289 N.W. 213 (1939); Gardner v. ;\faffitt, 335 
Mo. 959, 74 S.W. (2d) 604 (1934). 
